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legitimately expected by each party), and for the ubiquitous failure of
educatio?~ institutions to r~cognize, much less reward, excellence in teaching.
Additional understanding of students' expectations of teachers will be
necessary for further exploration of the validity of this mental model, as will
more sharply focused analyses of the assumptions that seem to underlie the
development of policies and personnel practices on American campuses.
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The bargainingproblem is here conceived as determining a point of
final agreement in bilateral bargaining situations where there is an
overlap in the interests of the parties. Several formal models for
describing how persons may solve the bargaining problem (in
particular, those of Nash, Kalai and Smorodinsky, and Felsenthal
and Diskin) are briefly reviewed, and three experiments are
described which seek a comparative test of these models.
Experimental results fail to provide clear support for any of these
formal models, but they do lead to a more generaldescription of how
bargainers tend to arrive at cooperative agreements. This is
expressed in terms of the three central considerations of (1)
prominence, (2) social efficiency, and (3) equity.
INTRODUCTION
There is a substantial literature in economics and other social sciences on
what has been called "the bargaining problem." This literature concerns
determining the point where bargainers are likely to come together for a deal
that they fmd mutually acceptable. The present paper is intended to discuss
some experimental work which helps clarify the nature of such bargaining
activity.1
THE BARGAINING PROBLEM
Perhaps an example will help us see what is usually meant by the
bargaining problem. A seller lists a house for sale at $91,000 but actually
would be happy to sell it at $85,000. In fact, she is not sure that she will be
able to get that much. A prospective buyer particularly likes the' house,
however, and wants to buy it. .He.wants to buy it .so much that.he would .be , .
willing to pay up to $95,000--$4,000 more than the asking price. But of course
he knows that you don't offer more than the seller asks. Although he would
like to get the house at as low a price as possible, he also wants to make his
bid high enough that serious negotiations will begin. He decides to offer
$83,000. Knowing what we know about the real interests of these house
bargainers, we expect that they will in the end negotiate a successful sale. But
what will be the fmal sale price? Somewhere between $83,000 and $91,000--
but where? And what determines where this deal will be struck?
Traditional economic theory predicts with fair precision where sale prices
will be in competitive markets, that is, where many buyers and sellers face one
another to make trades concerning quantities of a reasonably homogeneous
product. However, in cases of bilateral monopoly--where only a single buyer
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faces a single seller--we have an indeterminacy problem. Assuming that their
interests overlap so that there is a range of possible agreements where both
parties would be better off with a deal than with no agreement, we can predict
that they will come to an agreement. But precisely where this agreement will
be is left indeterminate. Labor-management wage negotiations, for example,
often have this characteristic feature, and this adds to the importance of the
bargaining process which removes the indeterminacy. Some of this same
indeterminacy carries over to situations within a market system where
competitive forces are present but are limited in their application; our
example of selling a home illustrates such a condition of imperfect
competition. While this illustration is not quite a case of bilateral monopoly,
there remains an uncertainty about where the interests of buyer and seller
will come together because of the special features of their interdependence
concerning this particular house.
As we move from economic exchange (where the terms of trade are
stated quantit~tively and in monetary terms) to forms of social exchange
(where the com of the realm may be only crudely quantified attention,
approval, and influence), the indeterminacy problem remains. It is less clearly
rec?gn~ed ~ecause the bargaining process is less explicit. But a wide range of
SOCIal situations can be seen as rough parallels of the bilateral monopoly
pattern. Two sweethearts trying to decide on a wedding date, a therapist and
client trying to negotiate a recognized "reality" about the client's behavior, a
mother and daughter trying to decide what the daughter is to wear, or a
husband and wife planning a vacation trip--in all of these examples interests
may be opposed, but not so much opposed as to foreclose mutual agreement.
The agreement will typically be implicitly stated rather than formally signed,
and of course the terms of trade will not be clearly quantified. Nevertheless,
if we look closely we will probably fmd the essentials of bilateral bargaining:
a ~utua! reco~~on of the desirability of some agreement, initial positions
which differ significantly, and movement to a fmal agreement which lies
between the initial positions.
As an approximate defmition, we may say that ..the bargaining problem is
that of determining a point of final agreement in bilateral bargaining situations
.wherethere is an..overlap inthe interests of the two parties. In this sense, "the
ba:g~ini~g problem" be~omes simply the resolution of the indeterminacy
existing In the overlap of mterests of two parties. However, this process cannot
be neatly reduced to a single problem. There are, as Cross (1969) has pointed
out, really three closely intertwined problems. There is, first of all, the
problem of determining the point at which an agreement is finally made.
Secondly, there is the process of making concessions through which an
agre:~ent is .typically reached. And, fin~y, there are the more general
conditions which set the stage for negotiations.
To. t~e our.example of the sale of a home, we have the problem of
determInIng precisely what the sale price is to be. However, this in turn is
cl.osely related .to the process of negotiations taking place over the sale.
FInally, there IS the more general set of external conditions in which
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negotiations take place, including such possibilities as a change in job
opportunities for the buyer, unexpected difficulties in getting a bank loan, or
a discovery of a leak. in the roof of the house.
SOME MODELS
Frederik Zeuthen (1930) posed the bargaining problem in the context of
labor-management wage negotiations. If the negotiations break down, there
will be a conflict or "fight" in the form of a strike or a lockout. Avoidance of
this conflict is assumed to be the motivation for making concessions in such
negotiations. It is further assumed that both parties can make rational
calculations of the costs to them of conflict, and that these costs can be
compared to the net benefits which would be realized in any proposed
agreement. These calculations in turn form the basis of a proneness to make
concessions in bargaining.
Concessions in negotiations can be conceptualized as a series of discrete
steps. At any point, we may predict which party is more likely to make a
concession on the basis of the relative costs of conflict. The question, in other
words, becomes: how willing is each to risk a conflict? This question is in turn
evaluated in relation to one's current bargaining position and the likelihood
that insistence on maintaining it may result in conflict. In Zeuthen's model it
is the combination of a current position's potential value and the likelihood
that maintaining it will result in conflict that determines the probability of
making further concessions. . .
Although von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) did not identify a unique
solution for the bargaining problem, their theory of games presented a
framework which has been used for most subsequent analyses in this and
closely related areas. It was not long after the publication of their primary
work that the theory of games was used as a framework to fashion a unique
solution to the bargaining problem. Indeed, several different solutions have
been proposed. Of these, the one which is generally considered the most
successful is that put forward by John F. Nash. . . .
In his initial paper titled "The Bargaining Problem," Nash (1950) identified
.... a set of 'utility theory assumptions derived from the work of von Neumann
and Morgenstern. He then specified several further assumptions to identify
a solution. Nash's assumptions are usually summarized as consisting of the
following four:
1. The assumption of invariance with respect to utility transformations.
This holds that a solution for one bargaining game should also be the
solution for any other game in which the utilities of either player (or
both) are changed by a direct linear transformation of those of the
original game. In other words, simply changing the utility scale values
should not change the solution. . . .
2. The assumption of independence of irrelevant auemauves. ThIS holds
that when a solution for one game is also a feasible outcome for a second
79
Mid-American Review of Sociology
game t· d wirhi
of the con arne W1t~ the fIrs~ (in the sense that all feasible outcomes
apply t~:~~:~n~Is~a:'~~dedm the first), then thissolution should also
3. The assumption of symm t. Th· h Id
the players are symmetrical t~: th IS I o. s that when the positions of
them equal payoffs In oth~r d e so utI~n must be one which provides
consideration of the players ~~~~dchanging the labels o~ the order of
structure of the available utility binot. affect the solution; only the
4. The assumption of Pareto o~~r;:,a~~tyatI~ sh~uld affect the solution.
cannot be a solution when there is · s . olds that an outcome
of the players could do better and thanothher feasible outcome where one
e ot er would do no worse.
With just these four assumptions fi d h
bargaining problem can be identifi i ~ ~ t at only one solution to the
motive game if it can be pia ed rea. a~ IS, fo~ every two-person mixed-
unique soluti~n results. This~ coofe~atIv:ly With Nas?'~ assumptions, a
summarized thus: it is the outco~~ ~h~tion as charactenstI~ which can be
of the gains in utilities of the tw ~h represents the maximum product
beneficial possibilities from their 0 I?a~ti~s ~ ~ey app~oach their mutually
point," where they would find the!:~ 0 /~gm (that IS, from the "conflict
Several years after Nash r es. t ere IS to be no agreement).
demonstrated a surprising rela~o~e~ted his model, John Harsanyi (1956)
e.arlier by Zeuthen. Harsanyi took z1 ~f ~at m?del to the one presented
sunplifying assum tions to m · ut .en s baSIC model and added a few
emerged with ganie theory P~a~1 fi:hWith the: more formal style that had
added was that each party'had l t ~ most unportant of the assumptions
to risk ultimate conflict (that is ~e:Jckn nowledge of !he other'~willingness
how eager the other is to reach an ows not only Its own mind, but also
Zeuthen model was shown b ;reeme~t). Thus fortified and refmed, the
bargaining problem which is m1th ars~YI to I?roduce a solution to the
rather surprising that these tw e~~tIcally equrvalenr to that of Nash. It is
rich in psychological flavor :b:~ e s ;oU!d have this.result. Zeuthen's is
concessions, while Nash's a ar' mo IVatlons. re~~dlng the making of
avoids any. in,elusion of ~S~ho~~~n~f ~athemNatICaIsunplicity and elegance,
clearly demoIistrates 'thei: ~. --- h' tT~ , .' . 9rc~s., , ..evertheless, .Harsanyi quite
for bilateral bargainin e!r mat ematIcal equivalence, so far as a solution point
g IS concerned.
.Let us note well the intellectual trium h hi h
achieved by the end of the 1950 G P he c had seemed to have been
solution concept for all two p s. ame t eory had not only produced a
it had now also produced -ae~:r zero-SU?Igames with its minimax theorem;
game, that is, for the situation u?~hi~~~~on fo~ the two-person. bargaining
mIXtures of opposed and com . e motIves for the particIpants are
reasonable axioms irrefutable in~~: mte:.est~ ~he solution was based on
be derived from ; more r proo ,an t e same as that which could
theory of collective bar ~ ~cess-basedmodel, namely in Zeuthen's earlier
Harsanyi solution conce~t ~n~fierocesse~d· Evden today the .Zeuthen-Nash-
n consi ere the appropriate theoretical
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resolution for the bargaining problem. There are, however, several problems
with this conclusion. One problem is the presence of still other solution
concepts provided by other theoretical models. Another problem is the
relatively low order of empirical support for this particular solution concept.
Let us take up briefly each of these matters in turn.
Although Nash's solution to the bargaining problem early became the
favorite among game theorists, there were other solutions also put forward.
One of these was first presented by Howard Raiffa, later more fully developed
in its axiomatic structure by Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky, and further
discussed and applied by Douglas Heckathorn. Following Heckathorn (1978),
we can call this the "equal resistance" solution, for it assumes the point of final
resolution to be that point among mutually favored (or "Pareto optimal")
outcomes where both parties give up the same proportion of the distance
between the "conflict point" (which would result if no agreement is obtained)
and their "best hope."
As Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) demonstrate, this model rests on an
axiomatic structure similar to that of Nash. Only Nash's second assumption
(the independence of irrelevant alternatives) is not fully followed for this
model. It is replaced with another assumption (called the "monotonicity
axiom'') which, though it appears less demanding, still produces a unique
solution.
More recently, Dan Felsenthal and Abraham Diskin (1982) have argued
for still another solution, based on what they call the "minimum utility point."
Their basic argument is that the "conflict point" (where the parties would end
with no agreement) is not the most reasonable base for determining where
the agreement should be reached. Departing from both the Nash and the
equal resistance models on this issue, they hold that the worst possible
agreement should provide the minimum point for each party's bargaining.
This worst possible agreement may often be the conflict point, but sometimes
it would be better for one or both of the parties, for the range of feasible
agreements would be all Pareto-optimal points that for both parties are equal
or better than the conflict point. If an agreement is to be reached, they.
reason, why not limit our attention to those points which involve feasible
.: -agreements, rather than to focus on the threat of no agreement? . .-.-
In many concrete cases the same set of outcomes would be identified as
the point of solution for all of these models--that of Nash and those of the
equal resistance and minimum utility theories. However, though the practical
differences are small, these three solution concepts (as well as several others
to be found in the literature) are mathematically distinct.
Theoretical discussions about the bargaining problem have been more
common than empirical tests of thevarious models. There have been some
studies designed to test one or another of these models--more for the Nash
model than the others, since it has received more and longer attention.
However, even for the model most applied to empirical predictions, Nash's,
the number of well designed studies remains small. Furthermore, their results
are quite varied; some studies support Nash's predictions, while others clearly
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do .not. And none of the other models have enough supporting evidence to
claim a superior empirical status to that of Nash.
.Given the inconclusive state of the empirical evidence for such models, wedecI~ed to undertake some further experimental work--work which would
providg a comparative test of three leading mathematical models (those of
Nash, Kalai and Smorodinsky, and Felsenthal and Diskin) as solutions to the
bargaining problem.
THREE EXPERIMENTS
We here will briefly review three experiments designed to study some
central aspects of bargaining, including solutions to the so-called bargaining
problem. We will summarize the most critical aspects of this research, with
the reader referred to the original report (Schellenberg 1988) for further
details.
.A ~ery s~ple 2 x 2 game matrix (that is, a situation for interdependent
cho!ce In which two players would each have just two options available) was
~eVIsed. We will be calling this our "M" matrix (after some incidental content
In t~e verbal scenario which was rust used to illustrate it). Although not
precisely the same as the Prisoner's Dilemma, this matrix had a structural
dilemma similar to that well-known game. When used with repeated plays
and an opportunity to negotiate the choices to be planned for such a known
number of plays, the M matrix has the result of predicting different results for
each of. the following three theoretical models: those of (a) Nash, (b) Kalai
and Smorodinsky, and (c) Felsenthal and Diskin.
Matrix M
==============
Column
Cl C2
Rl -,0 +,-
Row
R2 -,+ 0,+
As is sh0':"D by Ma~ix M (presented above), outcomes for subjects were
broken down into very simple terms--identified only as positive ( +), negative
(-), or neutral (0). The positions of subjects are those of either the row player
(whose outcomes are shown in front of each comma for each of the four
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possible outcomes of the matrix) or of the column player (shown after the
comma for each possible case). . . .
Situations were presented in quite abstract terms, WIth subjects SImply
encouraged to seek positive outcomes and avoid negative ones. Eventually
these outcomes were translated to amounts of money the subjects received
for participation in the experiment. It should be recognized that this abstract
framework would not represent any particular kind of naturalistic bargain~g
situation. However it was intended that some of the general tendencies
implicit in all bargaining might be better explored in this way than in a less
abstract mode of research.
In all of our experiments we used student volunteers, two at a time, who
were placed on opposite sides of a table with a visu:al barrier plac~d betwe~n
them (to prevent their knowing each other's choices for a particular trial
before these were announced by the experimenter). Subjects were given a
series of pencil-and-paper exercises for over an hour, with several variations
of the M matrix included in the materials presented.
Our first experiment was a rather straight-forwar~attempt to determine
which of our three theoretical models would best predict repeated play results
with the M matrix. Our results however, failed to give consistent support for
any of the three models we had set out to test. The beh3;vior of some pairs of
subjects did fit well with one of the models, but other p.atrS fit a~other ~odel,
and some fit none of the three models--but still had their own fairly consistent
pattern. What we seemed to have here was ~ surplus of solution~--pra'":tically
every pair had its own approach to a solution. But these solutions did not
appear to generalize in any main direction. At least there could be no clear
conclusion to favor any of the three models we had set out t? tes!. .
There was a strong temptation to end the research at~ p~lnt, le.aVlng
another experiment (among many) unpublished because ~f ItS mconslSt~nt
results. But struck with the rather apparent fact that our subjects were finding
solutions for their bargaining problem--their own solutions, which for most
pairs had a strange internal consistency--we decided to explore further what
may be behind these solutions., .... . .
In our second experiment we took a diff~rent tack. ~n the rust exper.lD1ent
we had given the M matrix four-sets of ten trials, followmg an op.port~mty· for
negotiation about how the pair of subjects might coordin~te then: actl?ns for
the trials. In this second experiment we gave them a smgle trial With the
possibility of gaining (or losing) up to 10 cents, but allowed them to agree on
plans for making, if they so desired, side payments. ~ctually, ~e ha~ thr~e
conditions for presenting the M matrix to eac~ p~ of subjects m t~
experiment: (1) in which pairs made repeated choices Without an opportunity
for an advance discussion with each other; (2) in which repeated choices were
made after an opportunity for negotiation, and (3) in which a .single choice--
but with side payments possible--was made after an opportumty for advance
negotiations. . .
Quite different results were obtained for each of these three conditions,
It was not particularly surprising that under the rust condition. (without an
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opportunity for discussion), persons chose in terms of short-run interests. Nor
was it surprising that the second condition (repeated choices after an
opportunity for discussion) showed most of the same varied solutions as had
been found in our first experiment. What is most noteworthy in results for this
second experiment is the high consistency of results for the third (side
payments possible) condition, which had not been present in the previous
experiment. Here most of our pairs of subjects showed exactly the solution
which would have been predicted by the Felsenthal-Diskin model. But why
was this model especially successful here, but not under other conditions?
At first glance it would appear that there should be no difference between
(a) presenting our M matrix ten times with an opportunity to win (or lose) up
to 1 cent per trial, without side payments possible, and (b) presenting our M
matrix one time with an opportunity to win (or lose) up to 10 cents, but with
side payments possible. In both cases, actual play follows an opportunity for
discussion and cooperative planning. In both cases the same matrix is
presented. In both cases there is the theoretical possibility of gaining (or
losing) up to 10 cents. However, a more thorough formal analysis may
demonstrate that the actual options for possible negotiated agreements were
different in the two cases. The condition in which side payments were possible
was accompanied by some further possibilities for the combined distribution
of rewards. Technically, there was an expansion of the "negotiation set" or
''Pareto-optimal frontier"; this meant, in effect, that there was a wider range
of mutually positive agreements possible in the side-payments-possible
condition than under other conditions. We may call this expansion of the
bargaining range an "exchange bonus." The main fmding of our second
experiment was the demonstration that this exchange bonus yielded a different
pattern for resolution of the bargaining problem than had previously appeared.
We have mentioned that the particular pattern of results for our side-
payments-possible condition was a close fit with the solution suggested by the
Felsenthal-Diskin model. Was this a happy accident (a result of a
correspondence of their solution with an especially prominent side payment
of exactly half of the gains) or real evidence to support this particular model?
To help unravel this question (as well as several otherquestions.which had
arisen), we planned a third experiment.
This experiment included presentation of the M matrix under the same
main conditions as in both of the first two experiments. It also included
presentation of another matrix, which we may call the "N" matrix (see next
page), under all of the same conditions. The N matrix had exactly the same
set of contingencies as the M matrix, only they were arranged differently,
leading to a different "natural outcome" (or expected result without an
agreement). The comparisons between results for the two matrices allowed us
to determine the extent to which the natural outcome helped to determine the
solutions that our subjects actually came up with.2
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Matrix N
==============
Column
C1 C2
Rl -,0 -,+
Row
R2 +,- 0,+
It is impossible to give a good brief summary of all the results of our third
experiment, including some especially interesting answers to questions during
our debriefmg procedures. However, it is fair to say that this experiment (a)
tended to confirm the main findings of the first two experiments, and (b)
failed to give results which would provide consistent support for any of the
three models which we initially set out to support. Furthermore, the main
reason that these models were unsuccessful was not to be found in their fme-
tuned differences, but in a general assumption that they all had in common.
All three models assumed that the solution to the bargaining problem was to
be determined primarily with reference to a status-quo point. Felsenthal and
Diskin identified a different status-quo point than the other two models, but
all followed mathematical procedures which were anchored in a primary
reference point. On the other hand, what we found our subjects emphasizing
was not so much a beginning reference point as a focus upon the possibilities
before them and how they might be most equitably shared. They did not pay
much attention to any particular point of departure. They did not particularly
let where they would end up with no agreement dictate where they actually
would come together~3 .'. :.. - . '
ANOTHER MODEL
Although we set out initially to provide a comparative test for three
formal models for solving the bargaining problem, our results led us to
question the adequacy of them all. The question then arises as to whether
there is another model which can better fit the results we obtained. To say
that there is such a model may be misleading, for certainly none exists that
can do so which has either the elegance or precision of the models previously
mentioned. Nevertheless, if we can accept a broader view of theoretical
models to include word pictures which are not clearly defined mathematically,
then it is possible that such a model can at least be given in outline form.
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There are three main considerations which together appear to determine
the kinds of agreements madeby subjects in our experiments. These may be
summarized as those of (a) prominence, (b) social efficiency, and (c) equity.
Our subjects sought solutions which would be easy to conceptualize and
translate into behavior. Where such prominent solutions existed that also met
standards of social efficiency and equity, they tended to be used. The even
split of gains where side payments were permitted stands as a clear example
of this. In cases where no prominent solution existed which met the other
main considerations, subjects either worked out an agreement which was less
easy to formulate and apply or else they settled on another prominent solution
which was at the expense of either social efficiency or equity.
By the criterion of social efficiency, we mean that agreements tend to be
sought that serve the interests of both parties. In our simple experiments, this
meant that solutions should be Pareto-optimal, that joint outcomes are not
satisfactory if anyone couId do better without making someone else worse off.
In more naturalistic bargaining settings the criterion of Pareto-optimality may
be too demanding, for as Cross (1983) has pointed out, the parties may not
have enough knowledge about the possible alternatives to be able to realize
their best joint outcomes. Still, it is a reasonable assumption that outcomes
with higher joint gains will be preferred over those where one or both parties
will realize less of their interests.
We assume, fmally, that persons seek agreements that they consider to be
equitable. Under the conditions of our experiments, this equity was primarily
expressed as simple equality. In more complex settings we would expect that
considerations of relative contributions or prior status might be recognized to
support something other than an equal distribution of benefits. Under certain
conditions it might be appropriate to expect positions at the conflict point to
have a major influence on what is considered equitable, though it appears to
us that the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky models claim a much greater
generality for such an influence than is warranted. In any event, some notion
of fairness needs to apply to an agreement in order for it to be fully
satisfactory.
We do not assume that persons necessarily emphasize these three
.:. considerations of prominence; social efficiency, and equity in equal-measure.
Indeed, a good number of our experimental subjects appeared to emphasize
two of these at the expense of the third. But no pairs in our experiments
reached stable patterns without at least two of these considerations applying
in a major way. It would be our general suggestion that bargainers generally
seek solutions in which all three of these considerations apply, and that only
if they are unsuccessful in this attempt is one or another of these
considerations downgraded. We would never expect to fmd a stable agreement
that is not supported by at least two of these three main considerations.
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BARGAllUNGANDBEYOND
The work reported in this paper continues, though the focus of this
continuing work is not necessarily on the bargaining problem. Although we
believe that our work has shed important light on bargaining processes, there
is as well a larger world to explore, a world in which bargaining is only one
aspect of the way human beings forge patterns of cooperation.
So far as bargaining itself is concerned, our work fits well with the
analysis of real-world bargaining of such observers as William Zartman.
Zartman (1977) has put forward what he calls "the formula/detail approach,"
suggesting that in real-world bargaining encounters what the .participants do
is often to search first for a general formula which they might build into an
agreement, then put together the details that would implement such a
formula. Our experiments, of course, have been quite artificial, and their
representations of bargaining processes are only a few small pieces of the
many ways that bargaining can be represented. Nevertheless, it is interesting
to note how well the observations Zartman has made about actual
negotiations (especially those in international relations) appear to apply as
well to the behavior our experimental subjects showed in their little pencil-
and-paper exercises.
Going beyond the study of bargaining and negotiations as such, there are
also wider implications of our work. Although we think it important to
formulate mathematical models of basic social processes, it is also important
to note the limitations imposed by the assumptions of such models. In the case
of bargaining models, such assumptions typically rest upon a beginning
framework which is expected to predetermine the fmal outcome. What we
found, however, was that humans are more creative than this in the ways they
forge their patterns of cooperation. They are not limited by assumptions about
their initial framework, once they see that the problem requires going beyond
that framework. This suggests a much more open--and less orderly--process
of conflict resolution .than can be currently expressed by most formal models.
It also suggests more broadly that we are not bound by where we come from
when it comes to forging new social constructions, for the dynamic interaction
. .cfself..conscious humans may-create results which they themselves couId have ..
hardly expected before they came together.
ENDNOTES
1. For a fuller discussion, see Schellenberg (1988) and Schellenberg and
Druckman (1986). The present paper is based on these two earlier
articles. The author is especially indebted to Daniel Druckman for his
collaboration in some of this earlier work.
2. In the accompanying illustration of Matrix N, the lower right cell
represents the natural outcome; while for the previously presented Matrix
M, the upper left cell was the natural outcome. The only difference
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between these two matrices leading to this change in the natural outcome
is the exchanged locations of the "-,+" and "+,-" celIs.
3. In this respect, the Felsenthal-Diskin model was closer to our results than
the other two models, but other results also led us to question whether
the Felsenthal-Diskin substitute for a status-quo point was not also too
limiting.
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My sociologicalactivities may appear to the untrained eye as scattered and
unfocused. The subjects investigated have included status inconsistents, youth,
terrorists, athletes, coaches, racial minorities, governments, multinational
corporations, banks, and universities. I have written textbooks for introductory
sociology,social problems, criminology, family, and sport. And, I have penned
essays on ethics, values, violence, crime, the Superbowl, the Olympics,and the
structural transformation of the economy. Despite the seeming disparity in
these topics and the variety of social categories studied, there is a strong
theoretical thread that brings coherence to these works--the conflictparadigm.
This paper examines the implications of this paradigm that guide my current
research agenda.
The assumptions of the conflict perspective focus research attention in
particular directions (the following is taken from Eitzen 1981, 1984, 1988). To
begin, central to a conflict analysis is that the institutions of society are
reflections of the larger society in general and the "master" institutions of the
economy and polity in particular. This means, in effect, that power and wealth
are inextricably intertwined and that they dominate the rest of society.
I have had a long-standing interest in power and the powerful. This has
resulted in research on the corporate inner group, organizational linkages
among the corporate elite, entrepreneurial capitalism, interlocking ownership
among 'the major 'banks, and domestic and international corporate social
expenditures. Currently, I am involved in an ongoing project with David R.
Simon analyzing crimes by the powerful. This research centers on crimes by
corporations and governments. In addition to presenting the rich and plentiful
descriptive material on these subjects we are working to reconceptualize
corporate and political crimes in a more logical fashion than has been the case
.• ' in the literature (Simon and Eitzen forthcoming). '..' "
The primacy of the economy in shaping social life has resulted in a
recently published collection of readings (Eitzen and Baca Zinn 1989). This
book focuses on the convergence of four forces: microelectronic technology,
the globalization of the economy, the swift movement of capital, and the shift
of the economy from one based on manufacturing to one based on
information and services, and their consequences for society, organizations,
communities, and individuals. The profound changes resulting from these
forces have led me to investigate further the economic mechanisms that are
increasing inequality throughout American society.
A second implication of the conflict perspective that guides my c~rr~nt
work is a basic mood of skepticism about cultural and social patterns. EXIsting
power arrangements are distrusted because they, by definition, oppress the
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